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 School districts rely on the municipal bond market to spread out the burden of their 
infrastructure projects.  Without access to this market, school districts would have to save up 
money for many years before they could build a new school or update their laboratories—or else 
they would have to give up this capital spending altogether. 
 
 Under these circumstances, no school district should be penalized for characteristics that 
are outside its control and unrelated to its ability to pay back its bonds.  It would be unfair, and 
contradictory to fundamental American principles, for example, if a school district with a 
relatively high concentration of black citizens had to pay more for its bonds than a school district 
with the same prospects for re-paying its bonds but with a relatively high concentration of white 
citizens. And yet in this column I will provide some evidence that, because of the practices of 
the bond rating agencies, this is exactly what happens.  Surprisingly, this type of behavior is not 
against the law. This nation has not yet passed civil rights legislation that covers this case.  The 
policy punch line of this column is that legislation of this type is badly needed. 
 
 My interest in this topic began with a project on general obligation, GO, municipal bonds 
issued by big cities.1  These bonds are backed by the full taxing power of the issuing 
government.  Because schools are sometimes city departments, some of these bonds were 
undoubtedly used to spread out the cost of school construction projects. In any case, I discovered 
that GO bonds almost never default, and I could not find any examples of default among the 
cities in several different samples.  A default, of course, is a failure to make some of the 
payments in a bond contract—or at least not to make them on time.   
 
A key feature of the municipal bond market is that bond ratings agencies can be hired by 
the issuing government to rate a bond issue.  These ratings are intended to give investors 
information about the quality of the bond issue as an investment.  The three main municipal bond 
rating agencies (Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s, and Fitch) say that their bond ratings are 
measuring the probability of default.  But if a category of bonds never defaults, this claim simply 
cannot be true. In fact, the probability of default for a GO bond issued by a big city appears to 
be zero! Thus, a bond rating agency cannot justify a lower rating for one city’s GO bonds than 
for another’s on the grounds that the cities have different default probabilities. 
 
 Moreover, bond ratings have consequences.  Many studies have documented that 
municipal bonds with lower bond ratings, including GO bonds, must pay higher interest rates to 
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2 The relevant web sites are http://www.californiabondadvisor.com/yieldtrends.html and 
http://nces.ed.gov/surveys/sdds/ed/index.asp.  I am grateful to Kitty Nasto for helping me assemble these data. 
attract investors.  These interest payments are part of the cost of an infrastructure project, so 
jurisdictions with lower bond ratings must pay more than other jurisdictions for the same project.  
In some cases, of course, this higher cost is entirely justified because the bonds are backed by a 
payment stream, such as rents or medical bills, associated with the project—a payment stream 
that may not yield as much revenue as expected. Many bonds with this type of backing have 
defaulted. But this is not the case with GO bonds, which do not default.  As a result, school 
districts that receive a relatively low bond rating for a set of GO bonds must pay a higher interest 
rate than other school districts even though its probability of default is the same. 
 
 This difference in cost might not be an issue if it were a random phenomenon, but it 
becomes quite worrisome if it contradicts principles of fair treatment that have proven important 
to our nation in other contexts. To be specific, it becomes quite worrisome if the school districts 
receiving lower ratings on their GO bonds have large minority populations.  The Fair Housing 
Act prohibits lenders and real estate brokers from providing fewer services or charging higher 
prices in largely minority than in largely white neighborhoods—practices that are called 
“redlining.” In my view, the same standard should be applied to credit rating agencies. 
 
 My 2010 article presents evidence that all three major municipal bond ratings agencies 
give lower ratings for GO bonds to cities with a relatively high black or Hispanic population than 
to cities with a relatively high white population.  These lower ratings translate into higher costs 
for infrastructure projects. Although it is not currently covered by any law, this behavior is a 
type of redlining and is clearly unfair. 
 
 The California Bond Advisor web site recently posted information on the bonds issued by 
school districts in California in 2012. By combining this information with demographic data 
from the National Center for Education statistics, I was able to determine whether the bond 
rating agencies also practice this type of redlining in their ratings of California school bond 
issues.2  This analysis is limited to GO bonds issued by unified school districts, which are 
districts that include all grades from kindergarten through high school.  To the best of my 
knowledge, none of these bonds, nor any other GO school bonds in California, have defaulted. 
 
 Tables 1 and 2 below describe these data. The entries in the first column of Table 1 
describe the bond ratings. The first entry in this column is a rating by Moody’s; the second entry 
is a rating by Standard and Poor’s or Fitch. Because the symbols used by Moody’s differ from 
those used by the other two rating agencies, it is possible to determine that of the 54 bond issues 
in this data set, 32 were rated by Moody’s, 38 were rated by Standard and Poor’s or Fitch (or 
both), and 16 were rated by both Moody’s and one of the other agencies.  No bond issue received 
the highest possible rating (Aaa or AAA) or the next highest (AA1 or AA+), but Table 1 
indicates that 18 districts received the third highest rating (AA2 or AA).  The lowest observed 
rating was A2, the sixth highest rating. 
 
 Table 2 reveals that unified school districts in California are quite varied in their ethnic 
composition.  The share of blacks plus Hispanics ranges from 7.8 percent to 73.0 percent, 




Variable  Mean Minimum Maximum 
Black or Hispanic Share 35.8% 7.8% 73.0% 







                                                          
    
 
Table 1. Ratings of California Unified School District GO Bonds, 2012 
Rating Numerical Equivalent Number of Districts 
Aa2 or AA 3 18 
AA3 or AA- 4 22 
A1 or A+ 5 9 
A2 or A 6 5 
Table 2. Ethnic Composition of California Unified School Districts, 2010 
As in my 2010 article, the relationship between ethnic composition and GO bond ratings 
is estimated using an ordered logit analysis, which is appropriate for an ordinal dependent 
variable such as a bond rating. The results indicate whether the explanatory variables have a 
statistically significant impact on the ordering of the dependent variable.3  As shown in Table 3, 
both the black/Hispanic share and the Asian share have an impact on bond ratings that is 
statistically significant at the standard 5 percent level.  School districts with a relatively large 
black and Hispanic population receive lower ratings, and districts with a relatively large Asian 
population receive higher ratings, than largely white districts.  These coefficients imply, for 
example, that a district with the maximum observed black/Hispanic share would have a rating 
two categories lower than a district with the minimum observed black/Hispanic share. 
Table 3. Coefficient Estimates for Bond Ratings of CA Unified School Districts, 2012 
Variable Coefficient z Statistic Probability
Black or Hispanic Share 3.27 2.20 0.028 
Asian Share -5.90 -1.97 0.048 
These results indicate that the ratings of school district GO bonds in California in 2012 
reflect behavior by the bond ratings agencies that is analogous to redlining.  Because lower bond 
ratings lead to higher interest costs, this behavior implies that for no legitimate reason school 
districts with a high black or Hispanic population have to pay more for infrastructure (and 
districts with a high Asian population have to pay less for infrastructure) than school districts 
that are largely white. This behavior does not violate any law of which I am aware, but it does 
contradict principles of fairness that are widely recognized in our democracy.   
New laws and enforcement mechanisms are needed to address this unfairness.  Bond 
ratings agencies should of course be given a chance to respond to any claim that they are 
practicing redlining. Enforcement procedures based on those developed for existing civil rights 
laws that identify redlining and give ratings agencies a chance to respond are explained in detail 
in my 2010 article.  Anyone interested in a level playing field for school capital finance should 
push for these or similar procedures. 
3 In an ordered logit, statistical significance is determined with a z statistic, which is analogous to a t statistic in an 
ordinary least squares regression.
